

Published by TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING Co., New York.

[Entered at the New York post-office as second-class matter.]

Fortnightly.

NEW YORK, JULY 15, 1891.

\$5 per year.

Clark
320.53
A1
#542

A CONCEPT

— OF —

Political Justice.

BY J. W. SULLIVAN.

- I.—JUSTICE AND PROPERTY.
- II.—JUSTICE AND THE STATE.
- III.—THE EXISTING STATE AN AGENCY OF INJUSTICE.
- IV.—UNDER A JUST STATE, LABOR WOULD COMMAND ITS
FULL VALUE, MEASURED BY LABOR.
- V.—THE PROGRESS IN SOCIETY TOWARD JUSTICE.

NEW YORK :
TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING CO.,
7 CLINTON PLACE.
1891

The Liberal Classics, (No. 8.)



FORCE AND MATTER

OR

Principles of the Natural Order of the Universe,

WITH A SYSTEM OF MORALITY BASED THEREON.

BY

PROF. LUDWIG BÜCHNER, M. D.

A scientific and rationalistic work of great merit and ability. Translated from the 15th German Edition, revised and enlarged by the author, and reprinted from the fourth English edition.

One volume, post 8vo, 414 pages, with portrait, vellum cloth, \$1.50; half calf, \$3.00.

CONTENTS :

Force and Matter,
Immortality of Matter,
Immortality of Force,
Infinity of Matter,
Value of Matter,
Motion, Form,
Immutability of Natural
Laws,
Universality of Natural
Laws,

The Heavens,
Periods of the Creation of
the Earth,
Original Generation,
Secular Generation,
The Fitness of Things in
Nature, (Teleology),
Man,
Brain and Mind,
Thought,

Consciousness,
Seat of the Soul,
Innate Ideas,
The Idea of God,
Personal Continuance,
Vital Force,
The Soul of Brutes,
Free Will,
Morality,
Concluding Observations.

UPB

No. 9. Unsettled Questions. 10 CTS.

Published by TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING CO., New York.
[Entered at the New York post-office as second-class matter.]

Fortnightly.

NEW YORK, JULY 15, 1891.

\$5 per year.

A CONCEPT — OF — POLITICAL JUSTICE.

BY J. W. SULLIVAN.

I.

JUSTICE AND PROPERTY.*

Given : A man with a desire. If he gratifies the desire, the man experiences a sensation of pleasure ; and in respect to this sensation, he is happy. But if he fails to gratify the desire, the man is disappointed ; and with regard to this disappointment he is unhappy. All the acts of man's life being in one way or other prompted by desire, his sensations as to the outcome of his acts are of two categories. In the one category

*In this paper I endeavor to bring within moderate compass the salient inferences and positions that, among the many I have seen ventured, to my mind most nearly accord with the principle exposed. I hope the paper may perform a double service : first, as a compact source of information for those to whom the ideas associated with this principle are unfamiliar ; and, secondly, as a formulation of thought, to be corrected or assented to by those who are discussing the social problem in the light of the principle. As yet I have seen no attempt to bring together principle, inferences, and observations in the manner I have followed. I lay no claim to originality in the production excepting as to form.

his sensations are those of pleasure because his desires are gratified or he hopes they may be, and in the other category they are those of disappointment because his desires are not gratified or he fears they may not be. A man's life is therefore happy or unhappy according to the sum of the fulfillments or possible fulfillments of his desires on the one hand, and the sum of the disappointments or possible disappointments of his desires on the other hand. As men ever strive to gratify their desires, happiness, we thus perceive, is the constant aim of every human being and the pursuit of happiness the business of his life.

.

Ideals of happiness differ widely. One man is dominated by the grosser animal appetites; another by refined tastes and a cultivated intellect. The savage may find his supreme happiness in gorging himself from the bloody carcase of an enemy whom he has slain, while the enlightened man may not complete his happiness short of enjoying peace, comfort, and every opportunity for self-development; but, undeniably, in both these cases, as in all others imaginable, happiness is the aim of the individual and the pursuit of it is what engages his faculties.

Whatever his ideal, obviously the one circumstance essential to the full measure of a man's happiness is the freedom to exercise his faculties to attain that happiness.

.

But unrestricted freedom within the range of his faculties may be enjoyed by a human being only when leading a solitary life. With the appearance of another human being on the scene, the possible freedom of each within this range is in some respects curtailed. To employ a homely but convincing illustration, two men cannot be free to stand at one time on the same

spot. Nor can two men be free to fell the tree, to kill the animal, to occupy the shelter, or to cultivate the field that one of the two has taken to his own exclusive use. By his very existence, each of the two must necessarily interfere with the complete freedom of movement and choice of natural objects possible, in his absence, to the other.

The desire of each of two men, neighbors, to live and to enjoy all the freedom to be had under the circumstances might bring them to agree that each should live as free as the other. Neither, then, under such agreement, might assert dominion over the land from which the other should draw his subsistence, nor might one without permission take of such things as the other by his exertions should adapt to his wants. And if both were to be actually as free as possible, wherever contact between the two was unavoidable the conduct of both would be adjusted to the highest degree of freedom for each, and in all things wherein there was no contact both would be absolutely free. If, however, under an agreement of equal freedom, one of the two men should attempt to interfere with the other outside the scope of such adjustment, such attempt would be an act subversive of the highest possible freedom of the man so interfered with; and, equal freedom being the normal relation of the two men under the agreement, the man thus aggressively interfered with would be justified in exerting a counter interference for the purpose of restoring the original state of equal freedom.

If these observations are true in the simple case of each of the two men in question with reference to the other, they must be true in the case of every man as he confronts all other men. This being so, if the end of politics is that men may seek their happiness, the first problem of political science is to discover the

limits of social adjustment compatible with the highest freedom of all who live in society.

This initial problem of politics may be stated in a two-fold question: 1. What is the domain in which adjustment by agreement between man and man is a social necessity? 2. What is the remaining domain in which there need be no adjustment, or interference?

In order to map out the domain in which adjustment is a social necessity, from the observations just made this principle may be formulated:—

*In order that every man may attain his fullest possible happiness, men should live as nearly as may be in a state of absolute freedom, but this being impossible under the conditions of society men should enjoy an equal freedom, carried to the highest degree practicable, the ideal being that point at which no man should be prevented from exercising his faculties except when performing an act by which he would invade the equal freedom of another man to exercise his faculties **

In view of this principle, the encroachment by one man on the equal freedom of another may be termed injustice. When, therefore, a man's actions give rise to no invasion of the equal freedom of another, they possess a quality that may be termed justice. Whatever a person may claim in accordance with justice may be described as a right.

* * *

This justice of utilitarian politics, it may be observed, meets on common ground with justice as seen by those who hold that there are natural laws, or in other words that the universe is governed by law, and that there

*Every one may seek his own happiness in the way that seems good to himself, provided that he infringe not such freedom of others to strive after a similar end as is consistent with the freedom of all.—[Immanuel Kant.

Every man has the right to do whatsoever he wills, provided that in the doing thereof he infringes not the equal right of any other man.—[Herbert Spencer, "Social Statics," Part I.

is a natural justice which is a natural law, giving rise to natural rights, such as the right to freedom.

And while the dictum, "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," which some men believe to be the social law prescribed by revelation, comprehends more than justice, it agrees in practice with our formula in so far as it relates to political justice.

Thus different mental routes have led men to a concept of justice which, to be consistent with itself, must coincide with equal freedom—one set of men accepting this justice simply as a principle for guidance derived from the experience of mankind, another regarding it as a law embodied in the nature of things, and another believing it to be the social law announced through holy writ by the creator of the world.

* * *

Were men to agree that the scope of man's justifiable interference with man should lie only in action taken for the maintenance of equal freedom, the science of politics would necessarily leave out of account all the actions of men falling beyond that scope. Politics, then, could have no concern with faith or any other attribute of religion, with benevolence, with private morals, with ethics other than political justice, with any justice not related to equal freedom, with any personal conduct whatsoever not so related, or with the management by society of industry or commerce. A man not invading another's equal freedom would be left free to do what his fellow men might consider wrong, or even—so far as political coercion were concerned—what he himself might consider wrong: such freedom to err being within his rights and a condition of his moral development. In other words, the nexus of political relations not being love, fraternity, religion, or charity, but compulsion, wherever there would be no question of interference there would be

no question of politics, and hence none of regulative law.

* *

In the light of our principle—that of leaving every human being free to pursue his happiness in his own way so long as he interferes with no other human being—the replies have now been found to the questions: What is freedom? What is justice? What are rights? What is the domain of politics? These replies contain the pith of political truth—the bases of social relations—if politics move from the principle we have adopted; and if this principle be rejected there can be no equality of rights, freedom cannot be for all, and justice between man and man is meaningless.

* *

The question above all others that next arises is the comprehensive one: What, under equal freedom, would be the essentials in practice of a just social arrangement?

To outline an answer to this question requires correct replies to the following subordinate questions: What, justly, is property? What is the basis of a man's rights in his property? Wherein must there be adjustments between individuals, and what are the just relations between individuals, as to production and property?

The replies to these questions may now be developed.

* *

Note, first, the conditions imperative in the maintenance of human life. Apart from the labor of man, the chemistry of nature annually carries on a work of vegetable and animal growth, without the aid of which all men would perish in a single year. Nature, besides, holds in the bosom of the earth, ready for man's use, deposits of material necessary for his

comfort, if not his life. In order to live, man must assist nature's chemistry and draw from her stores ; in other words, by his labor, "by moving things about," man must adapt to his uses and enjoyment things provided by nature, and this adaptation, continuing, as it does, nature's production, may be termed human production. Of what mankind thus produces, no man can obtain any part except by his labor, by gift, or by seizure from another. Therefore, to be independent of other men, to be free, each human being must be a producer. Each must form a link in the natural industrial chain.

This chain extends from nature's crudest offerings to the finished articles in the hands of the consumer. It includes, as its workers, all who promote production by hand or brain. Human labor, then, being the exercise of faculties, mental and physical, with a view to production, the industrial chain comprises, besides the producers of necessities, those who are preparing themselves to be actual producers, and those whom the producers of the necessities of life employ in producing what ministers to the comforts and enjoyments of life. And whoever is not of the industrial chain can be but a parasite or dependent.

.

Under equal freedom, the fundamental rights of man as producer would relate to the means of maintaining his life, his first necessity.

Could the common right of men to maintain their life be traced to no other source, that right would be found in the principle of equal freedom. And this right would permit of no obstacle between the labor of the producer and the resources of nature. For these resources constituting the one original reservoir of the essentials to physical life, a man denied access to them, the necessary condition of sustaining life, would

obviously be deprived of the exercise of his right to do that by which he must live.

Men now admit the right of all other men to freedom of access to certain of the resources of nature—the air and the sunlight, reservoirs of essentials to physical life—from which no one, asserting ownership, has as yet attempted to exclude his fellows. But the principle must be equally true of the remaining great resource of nature—the crust of the earth, the land, the direct reservoir of food, fuel, shelter, and clothing—from which one set of men, by the unjust laws of society, are permitted to exclude other men.

The right of free access to land admitted, it next becomes plain that, under equal freedom, the relation of the producer to land would differ from his relation to the objects produced by his labor.*

The relation of producers to the land could only be equal right of access in order to produce the necessities for their physical being. Hence, "equity does not permit property in land."† Land could be the absolute property neither of an individual nor of a community; it could be neither private property nor common property. It would be the inheritance of the race, continued from generation to generation, "belonging in usufruct to the living."‡ Justly, then, the members of a community might make such arrangements among themselves for the disposition of the land as would harmonize for the passing time with the principle of equal freedom, but there their rightful jurisdiction must cease.

The relation of a producer to the products of his

*Sustained by some of the greatest names— I will say by every name of the first rank in political economy, from Turgot and Adam Smith to Mill—I hold that the land of a country presents conditions which separate it economically from the great mass of the objects of wealth.—[J. E. Cairnes, "Political Economy and Land."

†"Social Statics," Chapter ix.

‡ Thomas Jefferson.

labor would be a right to them as his property. This right would follow as a sequence to the right to his person and faculties and hence to land. In other words: The principle of equal freedom ever forbidding one man to deprive another of the use of his faculties if acting within his rights, and therefore ever directing one man not to interfere with another applying his labor to the earth under conditions allowing others equal access to it, the principle would as well direct one man not to interfere with the products of another's labor. And the products of a man's labor—or what he obtained for such products in fair exchange—would alone be his rightful absolute property.*

* *

We have now ascertained what, justly, is property and what is the basis of a man's rights in his property.

II.

JUSTICE AND THE STATE.

The third of our questions relating to a just social arrangement is: Wherein must there be adjustment, and what are the just relations, between individuals as to production and property?

* *

Under equal freedom, wherever men should live and labor in proximity there would, inevitably, be political communities. A political community of producers would be a group having, with reference to a part of the earth, common rights.

* It will be observed that the rights of property are the outcome of the rights of the person.— J. H. Levy, "The Outcome of Individualism," page 12.

Nothing is implied in property but the right of each to his (or her) own faculties, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever he can get for them in a fair market, together with his right to give this to any other person if he chooses, and the right of that other to receive and enjoy it.—[John Stuart Mill, "Principles of Political Economy," Book 2, chapter 2, section 1.

Today the force of piece-work compositors in a printing office affords an illustration of a community working under the principle of equal freedom. It is not, however, a political community, politics having reference to the general and permanent relations between man and man, while the relations between compositors are but special and temporary. In the parceling out of their work, fairness—equality in freedom—being observed, adjustment of rights among compositors is necessary. The work of setting type is “fat” and “lean.” That is, on a given application of labor, some parts, such as blanks, yield more wages per hour than other parts, such as solid type—the scale of pay per bulk for all parts being the same. Hence an equal division of the fat and lean among all the workers. The compositors, in their capacity as compositors, are alone concerned in such division, and to this purpose they are a community of themselves. The pressmen, the clerks, the employers, though in the same building, some of them perhaps in the same room, are no part of the compositors’ community, and compositors not employed in the office are foreign to the office community. Fairness in allotting the office typesetting among themselves imparts to each compositor his rights, and the common rights of all unite them in a community.

As a trades-unionist, a compositor in an office community may be a member of other communities. His membership in his local union imparts to him compositors’ rights in the union offices of his town or neighborhood. His membership in the national (or international) union of all compositors imparts to him rights in a yet greater community. If his trades-union is in a federation of various trades, the federation is an additional community in which he has rights.

But in each of these communities to which a com-

positor may belong, the limits of rights, both of the members and of the community, are obviously circumscribed by the objects for which the community exists. As may readily be seen, the federation of trades cannot justly subject the compositors' union to a regulation having reference to any purpose except that for which the union joined the federation ; nor can the national (or international) compositors' union properly seek to pass laws for the local unions other than such as relate to the affairs of the members as trades-union compositors ; nor can a local union assume to direct the acts of its members save in regard to the objects of the union, these being the maintenance of the scale of wages and the practice of fair trade customs ; nor can the compositors of one office attempt to dictate the distribution of the work among the men in another office, each office, in respect to the work performed therein, being a community of itself. And, as a matter of fact, the trades-union, unlike the existing State, commonly restricts itself in every respect to its proper field—the maintenance of equal rights among those associated to accomplish its objects.

Observe, however, that the whole system of trades-unionism, beyond the domain of the office community, arises from a scheme devised for the purposes of war. The organized community of an office has for its object a just sharing of the opportunities in that office for earning wages. Its members consult and select some of their number to see to it that each man at work is allotted his just share of the opportunities the employer has given to all. Here the community is an institution natural in a state of peace between employer and employed. But the trades-union, local or national (or international), as a combination of sellers of labor, has for its purpose defensive war against employers, as buyers of labor, the ultimate object of the trades-

unionists being the highest prices and best conditions they can enforce—a feature in good conditions being the equal division of the work in an office. The trades-union is thus solely a war institution. Hence its struggle for self-preservation, and consequently the necessity for the enforcement of war measures, such as prevention of an over-supply of workers and therefore restriction in the number of apprentices, and prevention of internal competition and therefore refusal to work with non-unionists.

As office (shop, or group) communities, organized for the purpose of justly apportioning opportunities among workers at trades, are thus seen to be natural, so in society, under equal freedom, would political communities composed of groups of producers, organized for a similar purpose, be natural; but with this difference: that whereas in a trade a worker can be a member of but one shop community at a time, in society a producer might at once be a member of several communities, accordingly as his rights existed in agricultural land, highways, and the richer deposits of nature, such as mines, etc. As the lines separating one shop community of a trade from another are plain to the workers at trades, so in society would there be lines, though perhaps less sharply defined, distinguishing one political group of producers from another. As in trades-unions a member may at once have rights in several bodies existing for war purposes, so in society in a state of war might a man's relations with his fellows carry him into different political communityships. And as trades-unions today find war measures inevitable, so might society, or any portion of society that would seek dominance in a community or a country.

.

While, then, under equal freedom, in theory, all men would have an equal right to apply their labor on any

part of the earth, practically, by nature or by their own choice, producers laboring on land would be separated in political communities.

With his labor not actually applied on the soil in any given locality, a man's right to a part of the land there would be but potential. The right to share in the adjustment would belong in justice only to those exercising, or about to exercise, their right to labor there. All men not exercising this right would be foreigners to the community. The adjustment among the members of the community would naturally relate to the quantity, situation, and fertility of the land to be occupied by each producer, and to the security of his improvements.

Thus would arise a natural political community—natural under equal freedom inasmuch as the common rights of a group of producers in the locality would exist as consequences of the principle. This principle once accepted, rights, coexistent with justice, would spring from it, existing independently of the will of each man in the community, or of a majority, or of all.

In certain respects groups of men occupying land differ in their relations from other groups. A landholder is knitted to the earth; groups of producers laboring on the earth are in a measure conditioned on space; and while, obeying his will, a man may, perhaps with little inconvenience, join with or withdraw from any other sort of social group, he cannot rest his feet anywhere on earth among men without becoming a member of a group occupying, in some manner, land. And herein, under equal freedom, a man's rights and the rights of his fellows could not be dissolved. This fact leads to the consideration of social relations that are inevitable.

.

As the first occupation of man the producer was of

necessity that of worker on the land, so is the same the essential occupation of man today. And with the agriculturalists of a neighborhood, dwelling together in equal freedom, and exerting their labor on soil subject equally to the choice of all, would arise the simplest form of a natural political community.

Let it be supposed that the principle of equal freedom were accepted in a given neighborhood. A man then setting out to apply his labor there on agricultural land would at once be made sensible of the existence of the common rights of the members of his community. In occupying a piece of land, he could not of himself decide whether or not he might invade the equal freedom of others. Either he would be obliged to ascertain in some manner beforehand the sense of his neighbors as to what might constitute an invasion, or he would render himself liable after taking up the piece of land to suffer the consequences should any of the others assert he had infringed their equal freedom. In either case, the necessity would appear for an understanding in regard to land tenure among the occupiers of the land of the locality—among the members of the community.

It may perhaps be urged that in the case of vacant land a man might of himself decide whether he should invade the freedom of others. This would be true in the case of land lying beyond the limits of society, as there the land occupier, isolated, would be beyond the domain of politics. Yet, to define the limits of society might be difficult. Lands not tilled might not be wholly wild. Subject, perhaps, to some use as pastures or game preserves, the graziers and gamekeepers in such case concerned might have rights to assert against a newcomer. Justice would then require adjustment. And in all settled localities, death, removal, exchange of holdings, increase or decrease in the

number of producers, and the gradual assumption of the land by succeeding generations would surely call for readjustment and regulation.

Any theory whatsoever as to the holding of land in society under equal freedom implies such regulation, to be made either by the expressed or tacit common consent of those having rights. To accept the principle of equal freedom is to give assent to the existence of the equal rights under the justice to which that freedom gives rise. To recognize equal rights is to recognize the obligation not to infringe those rights—not to work injustice. In order to avoid injustice, the right of each man must be considered, and the general consideration of rights implies adjustment (regulation) in and by society.

Nature having given humanity no better guardian of a right than he in whom it inheres, to reach a common consent—to adjust their rights—all having rights in the community would in some manner confer. This interchange of opinion would bring the right-holders into political society. Should such society, with a view to the maintenance of rights, employ a stewardship or administration, temporary or permanent, the organization necessary to the end would be a body politic—a State. In interfering with individuals to prevent injustice, the attitude of the State toward any infringing justice would be government.

The record of a right-holder's opinion as to justice in a given case would be a vote. In respect to voting, three courses would be open to a right-holder—he might vote yea or nay, or he might abstain from casting a vote. Should he, on a given occasion, vote yea on a proposition involving justice in landholding, the vote would imply that, in his opinion, should those voting nay enforce their view there might ensue an infringement of his rights. Should he vote nay, it would

mean he held those voting yea to contemplate a possible infringement of his rights. Should he decline to vote, it would signify a refusal to recognize voting in the case as a necessary means to justice; it would be tantamount to a vote not to vote, and perhaps to hold, even to resistance, to his own view of settling the question. In the latter case it would be a secession from the practical community; but obviously there could be no secession from the community contemplated by equal freedom. If the secessionists held to their own way, and were to be followed by others acting in like manner on other occasions, the spectacle would be had of different bodies of right-holders proceeding to distribute the land in various ways. Were this to occur, no standard of equal freedom, no measure of justice, no common order of proceeding, in land tenure or otherwise, could be established. Regulation would be at an end, and progress in social life impossible.

Thus is it clear that social life in such a community would require from time to time an act that in one aspect or another would necessarily imply a vote. Men could not, for example, even agree on the initiative principle of equal freedom without expressing, by act if not explicitly by word, their opinion in regard to what ought to be the guiding rule of their society. In adopting that principle, they would vote on it. Neither, without voting, could they agree on a system of land tenure. And so of all other acts carried out in common. Before the performance of such acts, the persons concerned in them must have voted on them.

.

Hence, to establish in a community a vital expression of its justice would inevitably require a human institution. In what must that institution consist? If the rights of all were to be consulted, it could only be a

democracy, conducted by methods inseparable from a democracy at any given stage of human development. Observe how a democracy and democratic methods adapted to the present time would evolve in equal freedom.

If, on a given occasion, a proposition involving justice were before our hypothetical community, and the voters were not unanimous, the community would be in a dilemma. Should the proposition be abandoned, injustice might ensue. Should the proposers insist on enforcing it, injustice might be worked and there would be confusion. In this situation, what could be done?

The principle of equal freedom admits that a man attempting to invade the rights of another may be prevented from using his faculties. The principle thus contemplates a restraining power. One man may be restrained from aggression, and if so, then two, or ten, or more. In each case the will and judgment of those exercising restraint is to be pitted against the will and judgment of those restrained. At what point is power to enforce the will and judgment to pass from one contending side to the other?

* * *

Turn for a moment and see what in this respect is now done by men and what are the tendencies of governments in civilized countries. As a matter of fact, in all nations, however enlightened, various portions of the population are today subjugated, and in many respects against their will regulated, by an overwhelming force. The constant state of man in the present stage of his development, subject as he is to his predatory instincts and otherwise brutal qualities, is not that of equal freedom, but that of ruler in some respects and of subject in others. Mankind is but emerging from a condition in which brute force has maintained

privilege and the rights of man as man have been little considered. In this permanent state of warfare, parties (armies) in countries ruled by party, recognizing the dominance of force, regarding it as a disagreeable concomitant of existence like excessive heat or cold, and aiming at the least intolerable conditions of life, have compromised on what is at once a rational war measure and the least faulty expedient at the command of men—majority rule.

In this compromise, there are compensations. In civil war, victory at all events usually rests with the larger (as the superior) force, and invariably so when the contending bodies are great masses to a handful. Where otherwise there might be useless bloodshed, the expedient of majority rule is bloodless. Where contention might be interminable and disastrous, it brings about order, with practical conciliation. As a war measure, men adopt it when it is the least costly in life and property. Since the minority of today may be in the majority of tomorrow, in case of bad judgments it permits the hope of better finally. Wherever the masses of men wield power, they usually prevent reaction to class government and entertain the sentiment of general freedom. Moreover, the fullest freedom possible in any country is that guaranteed by the majority, as the superior force.

Approximation to justice being the utmost that humanity in its present development may reasonably hope for, in any democratic country the decree of the majority—as to the form of the State unquestionably, and as to tenure of land and property commonly—is the verdict of the highest jury its people can obtain on earth. The ideal of the State, the conception of justice, may change, but the social necessity of the superior force to rule must exist as long as force is opposed by force. In the State as at present organized, a body of citizens hav-

ing for their object equal freedom would be obliged to control the State before carrying out their principle with respect to landed and immovable property. To secure that control—by peaceable means assuredly, and by forcible means most probably—a majority would be a pre-requisite.

Moreover, it is only in regulation by a changing majority of the citizens that a firm basis is today afforded within a democratic State for a peaceful advance toward justice. No longer addressing himself to monarch or class, he who discerns a reform may reasonably expect that enlightened self-interest will eventually lead those to adopt it who are to profit by it. His fellow-citizens having set at rest the questions that in aristocratic governments divert men from the pursuit of the common welfare, he may point out the stages through which the majority must pass, and which they have the power to attain, on the way to liberty.

And what are these stages, uniformly? First, men must see that in justice the majority in their State—itsself usually an arbitrary division of the earth brought about by war—should refrain from ruling except in questions lying strictly within the province of the State, these questions in the end being only such as relate to the maintenance of equal freedom; and secondly, that the right to vote lies with no man except in so far as he as a member of a community is directly affected by its administration of justice.

When these principles shall be known and acted upon in any country, the State as it at present exists will have undergone dissolution. Nothing will remain but interrelated natural communities.

Toward this end the majority may be assisted by such individuals as would themselves be free. In view of possible encroachments by the majority on their rights, or on the rights of any minority, such individ-

uals may affirm that every man is himself (within himself) the court of last resort, to judge if his rights be infringed ; that, holding original dominion over his person and faculties, a man may ever assert his rights therein to be inalienable and deny the claim of one man or many, of community or combination, to rule over him. Self-sovereignty implies the right to rebel.

And the fact is that while for the time being supporting the State as a whole as a choice among evils, and through expediency holding in abeyance the right to attempt its instant overthrow, minorities habitually refuse to obey the laws of the majority in many particulars. In this, minorities, never having made a voluntary contract to obey the majority, are justified by the principle of equal freedom. Society, as at present constituted, being in a state of war, and individuals under it continually deprived of many of their just liberties, no guide in social action is to be expected of discontented minorities other than that of expediency. Expediency, then, on all sides, is the present social bond.

* * *

Thus are affirmative replies found to these questions: Does (and will) the majority, as the effective force, usually control the State? Is it commonly expedient that the majority should so control?

To the question whether it be right that the majority should rule, there can be but one answer: Right, politically, is justice, which knows neither majority nor minority.

* * *

To return to the supposed agricultural community living under equal freedom. Here, as we have imagined, (vacant land everywhere being free of access), the rightholders have freely joined the community, and the social bond is therefore that of contract. The

voters have put behind them all thought of privilege through divine right, caste, leadership, or inheritance of the soil. Here all are equally, permanently, and vitally interested in perpetuating conditions of justice. To what extent would the majority rule?

This political community, employing a stewardship, would be a State. Being the means of promoting the highest possible welfare of its members—in other words, of maintaining the maximum of possible liberty—this State (like the trades-union in the industrial world) would act on the necessity of self-preservation. The necessity for preserving the State would thus take precedence to rights as seen by the minority, the force necessary to that preservation commonly lying with the majority. Hence, the majority so deciding, the State might maintain the machinery requisite to enforce its decrees and resist foreign invasion—courts, police, an army, and the officials of administration. For this purpose it might impose taxes and incur a public debt. The sum to be contributed by each member of the community for the support of the State would be a question of justice—a subject for general deliberation. In case of difference, this question could be disposed of only by the majority. The majority would fix taxation.

Likewise, in all cases the sense of the majority would stand for the highest justice obtainable. As we have seen, social life without regulation being impossible, and in case of dispute the majority commonly prevailing, the justice to be accorded by the majority would therefore be the fullest possible justice. The State might decide never to use force except against the invader of the principle of equal freedom, and, where difficult to tell whether an alleged offender were an invader or not, never to use force except where the necessity for immediate solution would be so imperative that force must

be used to preserve the power maintaining equal freedom—the State. But dissolution of that power could never be risked. Whosoever should expose it to such risk would be an invader, an offender. Hence self-preservation would compel the effective power to hold the citizens to the duty of maintaining the State—by paying taxes, by observing the law, and by compelling offenders to observe the law.

It may be believed, however, that in such a community progress would be steady toward perfected justice. Wherever possible a majority, though acting for itself, might refrain from compelling the minority to act with it. Where nice questions of public justice were concerned, those interested on different sides might forbear insisting fully on their several strict interpretations of rights, or where a discontented minority should wish to withdraw from a community the majority might compensate it for its immovable property. Where works more or less public should by some be thought necessary, but by others not, those using them might construct them and for funds assess themselves. With all producers having equal opportunity to work, there might usually be no occasion for a police. If called into being, an army would probably be wholly of volunteers. In long periods, no necessity might arise for taxation. The sole restraint exercised, aside from each man's own desire for justice, might commonly be found in public opinion. Just regulations having become fixed in the habits of men, to formulate law might rarely be necessary. As in America we no longer write laws providing for an established church or forbidding chattel slavery and the right of primogeniture, so might nearly all law as now enforced be abandoned. In habituating themselves to equal freedom, men might learn so to live that in the end there would be no compulsory law, no show of force, no government of man by man.

III.

THE EXISTING STATE AN AGENCY OF INJUSTICE.

In applying the principle of equal freedom to civilized society as it exists today, we have established the just bases of a democratic State. The character of the justice to be attained practically in such a State may now be discerned.

On his homesite, justly obtained after conference as to rights with others immediately concerned, a land occupier would rightfully be subject to no invasion from another individual and to only such interference from the community, through taxation or otherwise, as a majority might deem necessary to preserve the conditions of justice—that is, to perpetuate the State. Should his acts result in no interference with others, he would be free on that homesite to utter his every opinion; to eat and drink as inclined; to read and print whatsoever he desired; to worship or not, as he should choose; to buy or sell without restriction; to hold of what he produced or give it away; and to make any contract that others might wish to enter into and to issue any promise to pay that others might consent to receive. And likewise, everywhere else, subjecting himself only to those limitations of his freedom necessary to non-invasive intercourse with other men, he would be uninterfered with, uncontrolled, ungoverned.

.

The steps by which the agricultural land occupier would be brought into additional communities existing under justice may now be followed.

With any extension of his field of action beyond an agricultural holding, the producer's rights would pass beyond the limits of the agricultural community of which he was a member. As a user of highways—roads and streets, railroads and waterbeds—his community (or communities, since, in extent, purpose, and

membership, there might be several) would probably be larger than his agricultural community. As a user of the richer deposits of nature—coal, or ore, or stone, or forest—to which his labor might be applied, his communities might again differ from one another and from all others. For the protection of his rights of person, his rights in trade, or his rights with respect to any conditions necessary to make the best of existence, his communities might reach out in many directions. To what extent administration of these communities should be consolidated would be a question, not of the science, but of the art, of politics.

.

At this point may be seen the rights of the producer in certain of the communities in question. The product of his land gathered, his right to exchange it freely with the product of other men conceded, then would follow the right of the agriculturist to freedom of movement beyond his premises and from place to place. Thus would he be brought into that community of his fellows having equal rights in the highways through which he was himself to move or to transport his produce. Equal rights in highways lead to important conclusions, first, as to their formation, and, secondly, as to their use. With respect to their formation: The right of a community to establish highways, resting on equal freedom among men in the use of the earth, would supply a just source to eminent domain, adjustment of the land for agricultural purposes not precluding a subsequent adjustment for other ends essential to man in society. With respect to their use: Equal rights in the use of highways signifying equal benefits, and any obstruction being destructive of equal benefits, to allow one set of men privileges of any kind in highways not enjoyed by all would constitute an obstruction and infringement, and therefore the right to

occupy a public street or highway with a railroad could not be justly taken by any until the rights of all the members of the community had been considered.

On thus seeing the rights of the agriculturist in his farming land and in the highways he should use, one next discerns the fact and the character of his rights in those richer deposits of nature—the waters, forests, and mineral lands—to which his labor might be applied. They would be of the same character as the rights in his agricultural community. And as has been observed, in all these different respects his communities might vary.

.

In regard to personal rights and the right to trade, no community could justly demand of the non-invasive individual a surrender of any right he would enjoy on his own homesite. In disputed cases, what might constitute invasion could only be left to the decision of the community affected, the reasoning here being that applied in other respects to the rule of the majority.

.

In the light of the principles up to this point educed, a brief test of the State as it today exists may now be made. Let it be asked: What is the attitude of the State: First, with respect to the political freedom of the individual; secondly, with respect to equal rights in the land; thirdly, with respect to justice in the tenure of property?

.

As to political freedom:

The laws of the State encroaching on the rights of the individual in this respect are innumerable. Not to mention those under other headings, among them are such as ally the State with any church, as enforce sumptuary regulations, as interfere with the right of the individual to labor, as protect individuals from

the consequences of their own folly, and as permit some individuals to coerce others through voting in matters in which there is no community of rights.

Representative democracies are oligarchies. Under them the voter votes, not on the laws to be enforced, but [1] for members of a legislative body which, when in power, may or may not fulfill the wishes of the majority; [2] for executive officers, who, during their term of office, are beyond the reach of the will of the citizens; and [3] for judicial officers, who in this country interpret laws in the light of almost inflexible constitutions, usually framed by men long since dead. Consequently, even the majority of voters are often far removed from power. The majority can obtain actual and immediate power only through direct legislation by the people. This is now had in limited areas in the town meeting system of New England. It is had in much larger areas through the Initiative and Referendum as practiced in Switzerland, a system that may be extended to the limits of any natural community.

When all law shall have been abolished except such as relates to equal freedom, and when lawmaking by representatives shall have been abolished and direct majority rule established in each community, the highest freedom to be guaranteed to man will have been attained.

* * *

As to equal rights in the land:

Considering population and area, it is evident that in general in all countries the exclusive possession by the working farmer of his tilled acres is approximately just. In occupying his land as he does, it may be that he infringes the equal right of no other man. A distribution of the land of his farmers' community under equal freedom, it is probable would leave him undis-

turbed. To his patch of earth little or no unearned increment, beyond his share as a member of the community, is attached. If there is none, his occupancy, once assented to by his fellow land occupiers, would, for the period of adjustment, a lifetime perhaps, be subject to no further regulation from the community excepting in the contingency of taxation or of the exercise of eminent domain. If there is little, the community, weighing disadvantages, might decide that any attempt to collect it would be a means to the greater injustice. In either case, once the right of his tenure, within the limits noted, were admitted, the landholder's possession should thenceforth otherwise be private, exclusive, absolute. This for whatever period necessary to bring him complete return for his investments—that is, for the period in which he might enjoy all his improvements, in the soil or in constructions.

The holding of land idle by one man against another desiring to use it is landlordism. This institution, as now upheld by the State, is founded on the denial of the right of deprived men to their use of the earth. But the sole just title to land under equal freedom would be in its use. In fostering landlordism the State is but an agency of injustice. Nor has the State itself—an aggregation of individuals—any just right to compel men to pay for access to the earth.

With respect to the richer deposits of nature, the State in all countries denies equality of access to the producers. Were the working agriculturists and their fellow producers to assert their rights in this regard, the immediate result would be a large annual increase in the produce (the wages) of each.

Equal freedom for the users of a highway requiring its maintenance at cost of service, the agriculturist's or other producer's produce should suffer in transport-

tation only the tariff necessary to pay for his quote-part of the total service—for his just share of the cost of constructing, maintaining, and operating whatever roads he should use. This the case whatever the character of the highway—whether roadway, railway, or waterway. But in general the rights of the communities employing railways have been ignored, the State giving to railway owners extraordinary privileges without compensation. Under equal freedom, such dividends as now commonly enrich the owners of transportation lines could never be declared. Their reward could be no more than average earnings for work accomplished. Hence, as compared with present methods, the original producers would retain of their product by so much the more. And what is true of railways is equally true of other forms of occupancy of highways. The members of a community have equal rights in all.

All objective production is division and subdivision of working the land and preparing its products for consumption. The labor of every man who follows an occupation profitable to man's physical being thus bears a relation to the land. An artisan, for example, is a worker on the more or less raw material of nature, his skill in the use of certain tools lessening the general burden of labor to support mankind. A teacher, a physician, a public steward, each of these, also performs a work that renders the more effective the coöperation of the direct workers on the land and the products of the land. In each of these cases, it is as if an agriculturist had abandoned all, or nearly all, his labor on the soil to take up with work incidental to that labor, though essential to its best development. Hence, under equal freedom, in giving up for the time being the exercise of his right to a part of the soil to cultivate, a producer in the classes men-

tioned would surrender nothing of his right to a free homesite. The principle awarding to agriculturists equal access to the land of a community would also give free to every other worker his necessary foothold on the earth. But nowhere does the State recognize this right, and the result is the subjection of the masses of industrialists to a system of enforced hire, leading to their permanent impoverishment as a class.

* *

As to justice in the tenure of property :

One's right to his property implies freedom to exchange it for the property of another. In preventing free trade, or in any manner interfering with an open market, the State is an invader of the rights of the individual. Moreover, such prevention gives rise to such combinations as trusts, which supplement the robberies of the State with robberies even greater.

To give one set of men control of the common denominator of values—money—is to endow them with the power of unsettling values founded on labor and of creating values purely fictitious. This privilege, conferred on a few by the State, is a grievous infringement of equal freedom.

Taxation for any purpose save the maintenance of equal freedom is robbery by one set of men, through means of the State, of another set of men. Exemption of some from taxation imposed upon others is, as well, a robbery.

* *

It is in these violations of justice by the State that lie the primary causes which reduce the working farmers, as a class, and the wage workers, as a class, to poverty. Could the working farmer obtain free access to land and retain his bare product, he might never want. Could the wage earner assume his right to a homesite and garden patch, he would

speedily in large part be free. Could every working farmer and every wage earner retain the full product of his toil—undiminished by the robberies of the State and State-created monopolies—the involuntary poverty of the masses would be at an end. Then, with freedom to exchange products, the quantity of labor to be performed by both classes would regulate itself, as, with freedom in choice of occupation, would also the number of producers and the position of every producer in either class.

What, then, starves men, degrades them, and so often condemns them to life-long ignorance is tyranny taking its roots in the existing State. In other words, it is the denial, by the State, of the rights of men under equal freedom. Of this, proof sufficient lay in the remarkable results of the partial release from such tyranny that men enjoyed in the United States before the land of the country was monopolized, land that as yet is far from being occupied.

.

Imagine, now, a part of the earth, in which no men were privileged. Opportunities in the land being equal, and transportation at cost of service, any producer or set of producers who wished might, at the average cost of labor, command the materials afforded by the land for any form of manufacturing. Trade proceeding with none of the artificial obstacles now imposed by the State—as in customs tariffs and monopolies—free industry would unfailingly bring the price of commodities down to cost in labor. Credit-currency being sufficient for the needs of trade, values of commodities could fluctuate only with supply and demand. All unused land being free, land could have no value except in so far as, in view of demand, the actual product on one piece should exceed on an equal application of labor the actual product on another

piece. All men sharing in a general abundance, the annual demand for staple commodities would probably but slightly vary with population. The planning of production and the distribution of occupations proceeding naturally, accordingly as each producer should perceive the possible fulfillment of his desires with the least labor, then might be expected to ensue the highest possible satisfactions to each and to all, both as producers and as human beings. Privilege in the hands of others would impede no man's way. Scarcity having its source in the denial of his rights would stunt no man's body nor dwarf his mind. No artificial social barrier whatever would arrest the aspirations of the individual within the range of his powers.

The problem of poverty solved, the problem of personal freedom solved, then might men cope with other great problems involved in the working out of the earthly destiny of man by man.

The problem of population might be solved. Wherever woman is intelligent and truly free, it is solved to-day.

The problem of coöperation in competition would solve itself. Moving freely in their industrial relations, men would speedily find the most direct means to the attainment of their wants. Whatever the special conditions at any period, the appropriate industrial forces, attracting one another, then freely gathering, and then crystallizing, would in combination work out their highest benefit, and when conditions should change and these forces be no longer the fittest, other forces, intervening, would dissolve them. Thus, for example, in the occupancy of land, self-employment on the soil ever within reach of all, men, exercising their choice, might cultivate their holdings singly, or in joint stock companies, or in the hire of other men, or in voluntary communism, accordingly as results

should promise to each, in a word, most happiness. And as with labor on the land, so in every industrial relation.

And thus onward the cycle of social problems might be completed.

.

Then, and not until then, would the way be open for the solution of this profoundest mundane question relating to mankind: Can there ever be on earth a universal reign of enlightenment and happiness—a millennium?

Plain it is that, behind the principle of equal freedom, there is in nature the promise of forces that assume a momentous significance. Mark the results wherever human desires have been unperverted. With freedom, individual, nation, and age have ever made rapid progress. And, whatever the origin of men's desires, whatever the meaning of human life as a whole, beyond question the history of mankind is the story of a long struggle to a higher life. The injunction of nature is that every individual should be free to be himself.

If each man may but freely obey the commands of his own reason and the cravings of his heart, the mass will advance. The lesson of nature is indeed a promise of the ultimate reign of happiness among enlightened men on earth, through the elevation and expansion of the free individual.

IV.

UNDER A JUST STATE, LABOR WOULD COMMAND ITS FULL
VALUE, MEASURED BY LABOR.

All that is bought and sold passes from seller to buyer in accordance with its value in exchange (or, simply, value.)

Value is purchasing power.*

Value, under the existing State, has its origin in two ways.

Value may arise from scarcity. Suppose a piece of steel to be produced under the law-made restrictions to production which are now common. The ore mine being private property, the mine-owner would exact from the mine-operator for access to it a sum based on what the operator would be obliged to pay elsewhere, perhaps at a remote distance, since the mine-owners of a locality would each hold out for the best price to be had. For transporting the ore, the railroad company or other carrier would charge all the traffic could bear. After each successive stage of manufacture, from pig iron to finished article, the manufacturer concerned would, in selling, if possible in the face of home competition, put on the commodity a price as high as permitted by the cost of importing and paying the tariff on a like commodity, and to prevent competition the manufacturers would probably combine. If "cornered" in the exchanges at any stage, the article would take on a further scarcity value. These successive scarcity values might be stable, or one or other of them might at times fluctuate or fail, but, under existing land laws and property laws, the piece of steel might at any stage of its production acquire a scarcity value, and at its final market might have an accumulation of scarcity values irrespective of the value of the labor expended upon it.

Value also arises from labor. Under equal freedom,

* Mill: "The value of a thing is the command which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general."

Cairnes: "Value is the ratio in which commodities in open market are exchanged against each other."

Whately: "Value is used to signify capacity of being given and received in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. The value of any one thing must consist in the several quantities of all other things which can be exchanged for it."

there could be none but labor-produced values. Observe the accretions of value in producing a piece of steel in case land and trade were free: If a royalty were imposed by a community on the product of a mine, it would be done to equalize the advantages of the mine with those of the rest of the land of the community—in other words, to divide equally among the producers of the community its natural opportunities. The royalty, sufficient to equalize the actual product of average labor on the average of all the land of the community, would be a labor produced value. It would not be a price for access to the earth, but a price for exclusive access to a superior part of the earth, paid to his fellow-producers by one of a group of equals in consequence of their relinquishing to him their right to this superior part of the earth. For transporting the ore, the value of the labor of the carrier would be added, and there could be no more, since free industry would bring down the charges to cost of service. At every stage, free industry would also prevent any manufacturer or dealer from adding more than the cost of labor to the commodity as it passed from his hands. Finally, the piece of steel would be sold in open market, and again no other than labor-produced value would be possible. Its sum of values would be labor produced.

.

Thus, increase of value through labor signifies increased wealth. A labor-produced value arises in the production by labor of things that are scarce and that men desire.*

But increase of value through scarcity usually signifies restriction to production and a consequent in-

* Up to this point the direction of my thought as to scarcity and labor-produced values was suggested chiefly by a paper by W. A. Douglass, of Toronto, "Antagonisms in Social Forces," printed in the "Standard" four years ago.

equitable market. When it does so signify, the scarcity value invariably arises in the legal withholding by some men of things that other men desire to use and, in justice, have a right to use.

There are occasional scarcity values that do not indicate legal restriction to production and an inequitable market.

One type of such scarcity values is that which ensues on the failure of a crop; another, that which attaches to goods suddenly becoming fashionable; another, that which is commanded by commodities produced by new methods as compared with the value of the same commodities produced by older methods; another, that of things "cornered" in the commercial exchanges; another, that of the labor sold under trades-union regulations. But as none of this class of scarcity values arise through privileges accorded by the law, justice would prescribe that they be left to their own correction. And sooner or later freedom uniformly corrects them all.

The failure of a crop brings to the point of scarcity a flow of the needed product from the world's stock, with an equalization of prices in all the markets accessible. The "cornering" of the products of the earth in the exchanges is today rarely successful, and with free trade the products subject to even temporary command by the largest capital would be few. The raising of wages through labor unions is no more than a partially successful attempt on the part of producers to retain under unjust conditions the natural value of their labor under just conditions, and freedom here would correct apparently high values by making them higher, since all wages would be raised to their natural level. The prevention of a fall in the prices of manufactured goods enhanced by fashion or by any similar

cause becomes more difficult yearly, it being a received economic conclusion that the value of things which can be increased in quantity at the pleasure of producers must fall to the cost of their production.

* * *

A step beyond this last-named conclusion is another, equally certain but not yet commonly seen in its full significance. It may be best approached by an illustration. The possessors of the total stock of shoes for sale in the market, ascertaining the demand in relation to their supply, sell shoes under these influences. If the price they make for shoes is then more than cost of production, manufacturers, attracted by the more than ordinary profits, soon increase the total stock, and prices as a result eventually fall at least to the cost of production. For a time prices may go even lower, but obviously they cannot long remain so, the life of a business depending upon its paying the cost of the production of its output. This fact now brings into view the further fact that when things can be increased in quantity without any law-made restriction whatever the cost of production can only be cost of labor, the phrase meaning labor in every form, to waiting and superintendence.

* * *

Scarcity values can therefore be persistent only when based on law-made restrictions. Every law-made restriction is a monopoly; in other words, every persistent monopoly is based on an exclusive privilege granted by law.

The pivotal fact of political economy is value. The sole factor in persistent inequitable value is legal monopoly (or, simply, monopoly).

* * *

The distribution among men of all things bought and sold proceeding in accordance with value, and

values arising under the State of today in the two ways noted—by labor and by monopoly—obviously there are two corresponding ways in which a person may acquire wealth: (1) By producing through labor things of value. (2) By monopolizing things of value.

(1) When things of value are freely produced (produced without legal restriction), a free market, as we have seen, brings down their price, through competition, to their cost of production: or, more accurately their highest cost of production, since the agencies of production may vary in cost. What is thus true to-day of manufactured commodities freely produced, would under freedom be true of all things produced. Then, cost of production being cost of labor, no one could obtain value in the market unless by means of equivalent value produced by labor. Buyer and seller would exchange service for service and labor for labor.

(2) When things of value are monopolized, the effects are: First, as to the class of things which consumers can decline to buy, their possessors carry the price upward toward a point where consumers will so decline. This is true in the selling and buying of gas, coal, patented articles, and similarly monopolized commodities, in which cases consumers choose between paying a monopoly price on the one hand, and, on the other, resorting to cheaper light, fuel, and methods, or doing without the commodities entirely. Secondly, as to the class of things which are indispensable to men, their possessors carry the price upward toward a point at which those not possessing any of them will surrender, without equivalent, all the produce of their labor except sufficient to maintain themselves at the standard of comfort for the poorest laborers of the country. This tendency is true in the case of the monopolists of the modern highways, the railroads, in dealing with the masses of agriculturists and other

producers, who are able to market their crops only on the terms of such monopolists. It is as well the case with the monopolists of banking privileges, who exact of borrowers a rate of interest in excess of what could be charged were the loan market free. It is also the case with the monopolists of the land in centres of population. And if the monopolies of the railroad and banking were abolished, it would further be the case with the monopolists of the rest of the land, the price of every acre of which would rise in presence of the demand of the landless for opportunity to live by their labor. As it is, the sum of the values of the various monopolies leaves to the worker who possesses only his faculties nothing more than the value of those faculties as sold in a forced market; and the monopolists who can combine—the bankers, the railroad managers, and the capitalists of the commercial centres—leave to the agricultural land holders, who are too numerous to combine, an opportunity to toil, but with little or no control over the value of their produce.

* *

From the existence of monopoly values results the spectacle of one part of society living on the labor of another part. A person having acquired a command of more value than necessary for his support need but invest it in a monopoly, and thenceforth, while the monopoly lasts, the investment will permit him to profit by the labor of other men. Hence, the opposing divisions of society are not capitalists on the one side and workmen on the other, but the forces of monopoly on the one side and the forces of production on the other.

And hence the primary division of production is into but two parts: That which goes to the producers is wages, and that which goes to the monopolists is rent—profits and interest being but forms of rent.

Whately's definition of rent ("Logic," Appendix) is :

Rent arises from the exclusive right to some instrument of production, enabling the employment of a given amount of labor *or capital* to be more than usually productive. The principal of these instruments is land ; but all extraordinary powers of body or mind, all processes in manufactures which are protected by secrecy or by law, all peculiar advantages from situation or connection—in short, every instrument of production which is not universally accessible, affords a revenue distinct from wages *or profits*.

When it is remembered that capital is an "instrument of production not universally accessible," the words in italics in Whately's definition will be stricken out, and, leaving out of the question for the moment "extraordinary powers of body or mind"—rent of ability—it brings his definition of rent to be the same as my own.

.

That every producer may enjoy the full fruits of his toil (minus his taxes), it is only necessary to abolish the unjust laws granting monopoly privileges—in other words, the laws giving rise to investments yielding rent.

.

With the repeal of the customs tariff, trusts would disappear, the incidence of taxation would no longer enhance the prices of the goods now affected by the tariff, and producers and consumers would buy in the cheapest open markets of the world.

With change in the patent laws to an equitable basis—whether this would involve total abolition of the patents need not be argued here—a vast change would take place in manufacturing, with the result of cheapening nearly all mechanical processes and the commodities turned out by them.

Other returns than that of labor by such advantages as those just named would come to an end with the legal privileges establishing the advantages; that is, an end would come to that form of rent usually termed profits

—a term not to be confounded with the reward of labor to men in trade, this reward being wages.

* *

Finally, how nearly rent of land would disappear under freedom, and how rent of capital (interest) would entirely disappear, may now be outlined.

Given: A piece of soil. Next, an average agricultural worker. Next, labor by the worker on the piece of soil, his application on all parts being the same and but one kind of produce being the object. The usual result in such circumstances would be that different parts of the piece of soil would yield varying amounts of the produce.

Next, suppose the worker to cultivate the various kinds of produce demanded in accessible markets; kinds that would probably comprise the range of staple products, each kind being grown on that part of the piece of soil best adapted to its cultivation. The result would perhaps be a reduction of the differences in value of the produce raised on the various parts, but still such differences would usually persist.

The surplus in the value of the product from one part of the land as compared with the value of the product from another part of equal area and subject to an equal application of labor is a fact seen to-day in every market. On agricultural land the surplus of one part or piece over another may be but slight, but as compared with agricultural lands a considerable surplus is commonly yielded by mineral lands and the like—by what we have termed the richer deposits of nature.

Under equal freedom, occupancy and use being the only title to land, the poorest land anywhere in use would be the lowest quality necessary to supply the

actual effective demand for products of the earth, and not, as now, the lowest quality to which labor has been driven through the general monopoly of unused land. Hence the surplus of value to be yielded by the best agricultural land over the poorest in use would be much reduced, as compared with present differences. Yet, area for area, the application of labor being equal on each piece, a piece of the best agricultural land of a community would surely yield some surplus in value over a piece of the poorest land in use; and to the user the best piece would be an instrument of production having, to the extent of the surplus, a value superior to that of the poorest piece. The amount of this superior value would be a rent natural in a state of justice. So would be the superior value of the richer deposits of nature over the poorest land in use. But there could be no other rent of land. The only rent of land possible in a state of justice would be due to the caprices of nature in returning varying rewards to like applications of labor.

A community, in adjusting its natural opportunities to the rights of its members, might arrange to have this natural rent (which economists term economic rent), turned over to its treasury, where it could be estimated and were worth the collecting.

* *

With abolition of privilege in what are termed municipal monopolies (the monopolies of city railways, of water, gas, and electric light supplies, and the like—a work now proceeding in many countries)—investments of capital in them could bring the investor no more than average interest at any given time. This is shown wherever such monopolies are controlled by communities and leased on competitive bidding; they then bring but the average returns to capital, with the average wages to the range of labor employed. Ap-

plied to railways in general, the principle must bring about the same result. And if tariffs to users were put at cost of service, there could be no excess of receipts over wages to labor and interest to capital. There is no natural rent for highways.

* *
*

With occupancy and use as the title to land, it is obvious there could be no rent arising from speculation in land ; there could be no rack rent ; there could be no rent filched from good will. Nor could any rent rise with increase of population excepting as increase of producers would call into use a poorer quality of the soil. The rent of city site land would not increase with increase of population. The excess (should there be any) of production in a city over that of an equal number of producers in the country would (allowance being made for any natural advantages) belong to the producers of the city, and the just tenure of the land of the city's site would automatically (if it may be so expressed) return to each city producer his just share of its total production. The excess of production in any one community over that of another (except that due to the difference in the original powers of the land) would but testify to better methods and institutions in the community achieving the higher production. In the final outcome of freedom and justice, it may be ventured, differences in cost of production due to the differences in situation relative to a market would be hardly appreciable. The rearrangement of population over a country would be in such wise that each agricultural community would be largely self-providing, while coöperation would extinguish local differences of advantage in marketing, and inter-community trade would in great measure be at a balance. So far reaching would be a just beginning.

To summarize : Granting a natural (economic) rent, but little of it even now attaches to agricultural land.* It is almost exclusively confined to the richer deposits of nature. It does not attach to highways. It would not increase materially, as a rule not even noticeably, with increase of population under freedom. It would tend to become lost through enrichments of poorer soils by labor. The advantages of certain localities in cost of production of certain commodities are even now being diminished by improved roads and multiplied railroads. The tendency of population to cluster in centres must give way to an opposing tendency as access to the land is made free. Under freedom, new forces—of coöperation, of improved methods, of economy in labor—would narrow rent-yielding land to an area which, compared with non-rent yielding land, would, as to agricultural land, be inconsiderable and, as to the richer deposits, be far less than now.

* *

Taking up now the forms of rent named by Whately in addition to rent of land, it is to be observed : First, how slight their influence on the general distribution of wealth, and, secondly, how surely they would tend to disappear under equal freedom. "Peculiar advantages from situation or connection" could hardly exist were rights made equal. "Processes in manufactures which are protected by secrecy or law" are at best but temporary. "All extraordinary powers of body or mind," commonly termed rent of ability, though

* See Thorold Rogers, "Economic Interpretations of History," page 236 and following ; I. K. Ingram, *Essay on Political Economy* in *Encyclopedia Britannica* ; also "Standard," (*Queries*) October 29, 1887 : "It is proposed [by the land-value taxers] to exempt so much of the homestead as is produced by labor ; and that would practically exempt all farm and homestead owners whose farms or homesteads are not worth more than \$4,000 or \$5,000, for the farm or homestead which is not worth more than that is really all improvement value."

an unquestionable factor in society today, tend even now, with exceptions, to a rapid modification; where formerly but one man in many could read, now practically every man reads; where the higher education was once within the reach of but scores, it is now at the command of thousands. And as to the body, what a land of plenty will do for it may be seen on comparing physically the masses of native Americans with the half-starved foreigners arriving on our shores. In a state of freedom, every man's body and talents might be cultivated to their best, strong bodies and developed talents, so far from affording reasons for leveling the wages of the able with those of the feeble, but forming in the eyes of the ambitious objects for emulation.

And so the end of practically all rent may be foreseen, excepting the natural (economic) rent of land.

* *
*

Under freedom, interest, as a persistent factor in production, would die. Capital being that part of the stock of property used in production, and being freely produced, its cost could commonly be only labor. On sale, it, or any part of it, could commonly command only its equivalent in labor. In lending it, lenders would find their capital subject to the law of supply and demand, and if production were unfettered each producer would produce in excess of his immediate wants, and a large amount of capital would thus await employment. Lenders then bidding against one another in the offer of loans would usually find no demand for loans at a premium, and no longer would there be question with them of obtaining interest, but simply that of preserving their capital, a perishable thing, and on occasions they would pay borrowers for its preservation.

How near to this point the world of finance has already arrived may be seen when it is remembered that

United States government bonds draw barely two per cent interest, that several state governments borrow at two and a half and three per cent, and the larger cities at three and three and a half. With the accumulation of capital during the past quarter of a century, interest has been falling steadily. Today there are those who confidently assert that the only obstacle now preventing interest from falling to zero on frequent occasions is the legal privileges enjoyed by money issuers. These economists hold that were banking and money issuing free, and hence contractions and expansions of the currency rendered impossible, and the system of extending credits developed as it might then be, capital could perhaps generally be obtained by borrowers on good security at no greater cost than insurance of risk and wages to the lender.

* * *

But the crowning wrong of the present social system is only indirectly touched upon in the use of the economic term monopoly value to indicate the unjust distribution of wealth. This wrong lies in the fact that those who enjoy monopoly values live on the labor of their fellow-men, the laborers, who, having in general little more than their labor, live practically slaves with the conditions of freedom and abundance within their reach did they but know enough to grasp. Because of the existence of the homeless and propertyless class, labor in general is ever sold on a glutted market. Whatever the produce of their labor, laborers receive in payment for it only sufficient to maintain them at the standard at which as a class they consent to live without revolt, or, revolting in labor organizations, at the standard at which employers find they consent to maintain a tolerable peace. The end of monopoly in land alone would be the emancipation of labor. Thus emancipated, and hence the way open to all other in-

struments of production, labor would soon sell itself in the market for no price short of its full produce.

.

Seeing, as we do now, the causes of monopoly values—of rent (profits and interest being subdivisions of it)—and the presence in the labor market of the landless and propertyless class, we see also why one part of mankind live on the labor of another part, and we see moreover that, were access to the resources of nature free to producers, and privileges in trade (including banking) abrogated, every producer would receive the full products of his toil (excepting taxes), that all commodities would usually sell at their cost in labor, and that the sole origin and measure of values would be labor.

V.

THE PROGRESS IN SOCIETY TOWARD JUSTICE.

It may be contended with good reason that, politically and economically, the actual tendency in the civilized world is toward the solution of social problems through justice.

.

The right of every male citizen of a country to a voice in its laws is rapidly acquiring recognition with nearly every people who are above semi-barbarism. Wherever parliamentary government thus obtains a broad footing, a movement arises toward democracy. Democratic methods once entered upon, the question of giving woman a vote is confronted. Beyond these stages, in one part of the world or another, it has been demonstrated how the State may be restricted to its natural sphere, how public administration may be simplified, and how the will of the majority may be ascertained and directly carried out as to every principle of law and every public act performed by officials.

The New England town system, with its purely democratic legislation, today responds, within the limits of its political scope, to the needs of a natural community, and, as is proverbial, has within these limits fulfilled the promises of justice. Every citizen being cognizant of his rights as a citizen, and having opportunity of exercising them at the town meeting, the towns are commonly managed with notable economy and fairness, their influence extending to affairs of the county and sometimes of the state.* Roads, schools, and other public institutions in New England are models for the rest of the country.

In Switzerland, whence the institution was derived, the principles of the town meeting have been carried, to a greater or less extent, into cantonal and Federal affairs. In some of the cantons (states) the legislative bodies are little more than committees to recommend and formulate laws, while the executives are but stewards with slight latitude of discretion; this for the reason that the Initiative gives a small proportion of the voters power to propose any law, and the Referendum brings before the people, for veto or approval, every bill passed by the legislature and every action proposed by the executives. The citizens retain constant direction of the law and of its execution.

Switzerland has thus brought its more prominent institutions near to justice. It has made Federal and cantonal constitutions the instruments of the present generation, changeable in their entirety at any time; it has made the laws plain to all in their direct and simple language; it has abolished one-man power in executive places; it has, in many cantons, made of its legislators simply committee-men; it has in large measure done away with the politician; it has

* See "Harper's Magazine," June, 1891; Henry Loomis Nelson on "Town and Village Government."

brought about a remarkable purification of the press, since measures, not men, are the subjects of public discussion; it has made the army democratic; it has reduced taxes and improved the methods of taxation, especially in the communes and cantons; it has made the post-office, railroad, and telegraph services (conditions considered) the best and cheapest of the world. More than all, it has rendered vicious and reactionary legislation hardly possible.

In America, the public is awakening to the merits of direct legislation by the citizenship. The leading trades-unions—among them the cigar-makers', the carpenters', the bakers', and the printers'—have the Referendum in constant play. With the New England town system, the New York method of registration, the secret state ballot, and the public counting of the votes, the Initiative and Referendum may be successfully introduced.

The shifting stream of public feeling permits no prophecy as to the order in which political and economic reforms may occur. Yet this may be said: The plutocracy that rules this country by purchase of our oligarchies—in the legislatures, in executive offices, and on the bench—can never be placed entirely at the mercy of the voters except by abolishing the law-making monopoly and its associated political machine monopolies. And no economic reform can be stable until plutocratic measures, as all others, are subjected to the general vote. With direct legislation by the citizenship, practical questions might be made, in town, county, state, or nation, at opportune times, of propositions now accepted by many lovers of justice. Then would the way be clear for the abolition of the conspiracy laws designed to oppress workingmen and of the laws permitting the employment of private detective police as mercenary armies. The

repeal could be demanded as well of laws giving privileges to banks; of laws for the collection of debts; of usury laws;—and also of tariff laws; of internal revenue tax laws; and of license laws. Equally, of laws disqualifying woman from full citizenship; of all so-called dead laws; of every statute failing to recognize the equality of all before the law, and the right of each to the unfettered range of his individual liberties. And this must necessitate the cessation of property in unused land. Further, demand could be made for the abolition of the Presidency, the Vice-Presidency, the governorships, and the mayorships, with the substitution of executive commissions, as in Switzerland; and of the United States Senate and State senates, leaving the formulation of law to legislative bodies close to the people.

* *

Economically, as politically, in its most important aspects the movement today is toward justice.

In the United States, the relation of the State to production falls within one of four categories:

1. The State, in many respects, leaves industry (and competition) free.

2. The State controls certain monopolies of the land, such as canals and ferries, and street railways, and water, gas, and electric light supplies of cities.

3. The State places in private hands certain monopolies of the land (the agricultural soil and the richer deposits of nature), or creates the conditions in which monopolies develop, as in the case of the tariff.

4. The State, aiming at self-preservation, maintains State monopolies, such as that of the mail and of the common schools.

Under freedom, all industry would be in the first category (freedom) and all forms of land monopoly in the second (controlled by the State). Yet, when force

should be necessary to preserve itself, the State (the majority) would place at least the means of transportation and communication in the fourth.

The municipalizing of monopolies is a transferral of forms of land monopoly from the third category (private monopoly), to the second (control of the State), with, in instances, a further transferral of the attendant industry to the first (freedom). By municipalizing monopolies an end is sought to the legalized appropriation by one set of men of the earnings of another. It is a decided step in the direction of justice.

In taking this step, a municipality finds the task complicated. Two distinct elements are to be considered—the land monopoly and the industry operated with it. To assert control of the land monopoly without interfering with the industry is usually not possible. The first necessary move may then be to take possession, by just means, of both. Next, while retaining control of the monopoly, the municipality moving toward justice would leave the industry, as any other, free.

These observations in view, it may be held that, were the United States to possess itself of any inter-state railroad, canal, telegraph, telephone, or other means of inter-state transportation or communication; were a state to obtain possession of any similar agency operating within state limits; were a city to obtain possession of the local railroads, ferries, water-works, electric plants, in short, of all its industries requiring municipal franchises; were any of the richer deposits of nature—forests, waters, quarries, mineral lands, etc.—placed under the control of the communities applying their labor to them, all these acts might be in harmony with progress toward social justice. They would be assertions of the common rights as against privileges now enjoyed by some men at the expense of others.

Hence justice approves of the action of twenty-four

of the twenty-eight leading cities of America in taking possession of their water supply; of Philadelphia, Wheeling, Richmond and other cities in taking control of their gas supply; of the many towns that now undertake public electric lighting; of New York in selling the franchises of its new street car lines at auction, reserving to the city control of the monopoly; of New York in acquiring ownership of a third and controlling the whole of its water front; of New York and Brooklyn in building the great bridge and its railroad; of the same cities in leasing their ferry privileges; of American cities in general in supplying municipal market places.

* *

It is commonly believed that the movement of governments is toward State Socialism. When railroads pass under the control of a State, when a city takes possession of its gas or water works, when any public service is withdrawn from a private corporation and placed with the stewards of the people, the event is commented on as evidence of the coming Socialism. On the contrary, on examining it in the light of justice, nearly every such step will be found to be a movement toward justice, and not toward servitude under the State. Nowhere is the trend of affairs toward the two leading measures of State Socialism—State directed compulsory coöperative production on nationalized land and State-directed compulsory coöperative operation of industries not now associated with monopolies.

Observe wherein State Socialism departs from justice.

The labor of a man on the earth—even the crudest labor exerted on land of ordinary quality—will, as seasons go, in any habitable climate, yield a plentiful living for a family of the average number. On this great

fact of nature a man working for himself on a piece of land may build rational hopes of maintaining his life, of acquiring capital, of emancipating himself from a continual struggle for existence, of finding sustenance for his children and dependent ones, of laying up provision for old age, of employing other men in producing luxuries, and of obtaining leisure for relaxation and mental improvement. Here is advancement for the race.

Applied in the case of the man thus working on land in his own possession, the reasoning that gives rise to the theory of State Socialism will fail. As defined by Karl Marx, capitalism is the power which, wielded by those holding the tools of production—land and machinery—enables them to take from the deprived class all the fruits of their labor, except a bare subsistence. As employed by Marx, the term “surplus value” describes the value beyond the wages of the employé taken by the employer through the power of capitalism. But with the man working on land in his own possession there can be in that respect neither capitalism nor surplus value. As Marx points out in the concluding chapters of “Capital,” the entire produce of the labor of a man so situated is gathered into his own hands. Plainly, then, from that basic stage on in production the State need do nothing but preserve the conditions of justice.

The State Socialists propose that the State (1) possess itself of the “natural sources of production and the instruments of labor,”* and (2) “substitute the co-operative commonwealth for the present state of planless production.”† This would reduce every citizen to a state of vassalage to the majority in every respect, both as to his movements and as to the production and dis-

* Platform of the Socialist Labor Party, Chicago, October 12, 1889

† The same.

tribution of wealth. It would leave a man his own master in nothing. His liberty, his faculties, his life, would each be subject to constant supervision and direction. Hence, the political and economic principles of State Socialism and those of equal freedom clash from the beginning. Reconciliation between them is impossible. State Socialism would prevent the one condition of man's self-hood, his freedom, and serve to obliterate the perception of that quality peculiar to humanity, justice. It may be ventured, as well, that under the methods of State Socialism, as compared with the wealth to follow free industry, the world would be in poverty.

.

The lessons learned in municipalizing monopolies may shed light on the methods best to be followed in placing other land monopolies under the control of their appropriate communities and transferring the attendant industries, when there are any, to freedom.

In selling the franchises of its new street railroads at auction, New York affords to the purchasers no more than the opportunity to gain current wages and current interest. This while the roads that acquired franchises before they were so sold are paying dividends on stock largely inflated, in instances several hundred per cent. The value of the latter franchises is thus, for the most part, a pure monopoly value. It ought, in justice, never to have existed. Next, note that if, instead of permitting the usual fare of five cents a ride on the lines purchasing franchises, the city had placed the fare at cost of service, the franchise would return no value to the city. That is, as has been said, there is no economic rent in highways.

A railway operated at cost of service in competition with one paying dividends on inflated stock would quickly cause such stock to fall to the basis of paying

only labor and interest, as was, in principle, the case when the Brooklyn bridge lowered the value of several East river ferries. If a cost-of-service railway were run between Chicago and New York, it would destroy many million dollars of fictitious capital in the existing railroads between those cities. If one were run from New York to the Pennsylvania coal mines, it, also, would wipe out many millions of monopoly value. If sufficient of the coal mines now unused were then opened up at cost and operated in connection with the cost-of-service railway, the present monopoly of the New York coal market would be at an end, and the mines of the monopolists would lose much, perhaps nearly all, of their value.

If the principle of reducing land values through competition is true of the classes of land mentioned (highways and mines), it must also prove true in case unused city site lands were brought into competition with lands of the same class. That this is so has been demonstrated when rapid transit has lowered the value of the lands competed with by the lands newly brought into market. Clearly, if the unused lands of New York city were made free, there could hardly remain any value to a large part of the land of the city now in use. Most of it would sell for little more than the value of its improvements. And if in every community of the country—in town, city, county, mining region—the unused lands were made free (that is, administered in accordance with justice), the land values of the country would be but a small fraction of what they are now, present values being largely the result of monopoly. The effect would be the same as when Western lands competed with and lowered the value of land in the East and Great Britain.

* * *

Here comes into view the injustice of the proposition

to centre taxation on the value of land and then gradually raise it as near the full existing value as might be. The proposition is really that, for an indefinite time, the State continue to support a monopoly value with one hand (as it is doing) and take it, or part of it, away with the other ; that the State go on recognizing the right of landlords to deprive labor of its produce, its property, but partly balance the robbery by another from the landlords on its own account. The proposition moreover involves a large increase in the monopoly value of land during the slow progress of the abolition of other taxes and subsequent concentration and probable advance of the land value tax, since with each improvement in taxation and each decline of a monopoly founded on the tariff land values would rise, as has been the fact in England. Finally, should the stage ever be reached at which title to unused lands would be surrendered, an act not provided for by Single-taxers (in fact, they propose to "leave to landlords their titles"), the attitude of the State toward the land occupier would then permanently be that of landlord toward tenant, while justice would prescribe the relations of the land occupier to the community to be that of one free party in a contract toward another. The importance of this latter point will develop on reflection.

A community may justly collect economic rent and distribute it among the producers, but no State can, as is proposed by the Single-taxers, justly authorize the collection by landlords of a monopoly rent—exceeding perhaps by many times the economic rent—and then take from the landlords a part of it, to be spent in public works for the questionable benefit of producers and non-producers.

.

The course of justice is not roundabout, and the

effects of justice are not indirect. Were the State but to remove its restraining hand, any community in the United States might proceed toward equalizing the rights of its members in land and might lower its land values by a large percentage, and keep them down, by freeing its unused and its low-priced lands.

Social injustice has somewhat supplied the conditions of social remedy. In many of the industrial centres the landless classes are in the majority. With the power of appropriating public moneys, a majority in such a centre, might, through eminent domain, buy up sufficient land for the needs of those wishing to obtain their rights in the land, and continue so doing whenever honest claim should be made for homesites or other purposes for which the land of the community would be appropriate. The demand for the land of the neighborhood in private hands thus in large measure withdrawn, its value would fall. The independence of a home or a garden or a small farm once enjoyed by the theretofore landless producers, they would refuse to work for low wages. Comfort attained for the producers in any one community by such means would attract widespread attention, and an example be had for other communities similarly constituted.

Possessory title to a piece of land might be given by the community to an occupant after a certain period of occupancy and the expenditure on improvements of a sum proportioned to the price paid by the community for his land. Up to a certain valuation his entire holding might be exempt from taxes or ground rent. The revenue of the community might be raised through progressive taxation of inheritances, incomes, and the higher priced real estate, land values being rated higher than improvement values. This on the principle that, large fortunes almost invariably springing from monopoly, a roughshod justice might aim at the return of

monopoly values, with the least friction, to the producers.

A sure foundation for social reform is intelligent self-interest. In a community of homes, the questions of municipal monopolies, of railway and banking monopolies, and of false systems of taxation, could not fail to receive attention. Escape being made through justice from the menace of dire poverty, the producers might proceed, by the way of justice, toward equal conditions in general.

Observe the support in precedent and opinion to be given the line of action just suggested. Forty years ago it was recognized as part of the duty of this republic to provide every citizen with a homestead. Under the mining laws, possession is given for periods according to the value of improvements. The exercise of eminent domain to provide homesites for the workers is advocated by Col. Robert G. Ingersoll. The taxing of inheritances is in New York growing more popular yearly, owing to the ease of collection and amount of revenue. The taxing of large properties, even to 50 per cent, is argued for by Andrew Carnegie. Both in the British House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies the question has come up, during the past year, whether the State should not acquire unutilized lands and lease them to the workers. Referring to the gradual assumption of the land by the community, an English economist* writes: "When that principle became the moral basis of a settled policy, public lands would not be allowed to slip from public hands; the permanent fiscal burdens on land—which are really a reserved rental belonging to the State—would be jealously maintained; lands held in trust by corporations might be transferred by the

* J. H. Levy, "Outcome of Individualism."

State on equitable terms ; the passing away of some of the absurdities of the law of inheritances would result in many rich windfalls to the State ; reversions whose market value is little might advantageously be acquired, and, last but not least, we might reasonably look forward to bequests and gifts of land and other property to the State being much more frequent."

* *

With lawmaking in the hands of the citizenship, rights in the land made equal, and privilege in the hands of none, the now partially arrested development of free industry would go on unchecked, and all commodities fall to cost of labor in production. Corporations, shorn of their monopolies, would benefit the public by reason of their economies, their gains in all respects fairly earned wages. The peculiar advantages of profit sharing, of joint stock organization, of building and loan associations, of the Rochdale or other systems of coöperative distribution, of all the practical means that the ingenuity of man has devised, would be taken up and applied by the masses now paralyzed by poverty. Civilized methods would permeate all society. Each individual who wished might do and dare. Where men are now cautious lest poverty await them, then would they risk, seeing enough even if thrown back on their labor alone. Where many now drudge at pursuits distasteful to them, each might find the place for his talent. Wherever the eye of the watchful saw shorter paths, there would enterprise go. All-embracing competition would achieve the compactest coöperation. Society would witness the least waste with the least necessary production. Yet all who wished might be rich.

Prophecy such as this may be confidently made, since by far the mightiest social force would be freed. It is human desire.

IN PREPARATION:

DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE CITIZENSHIP.

By J. W. Sullivan.

- I. The Referendum and Initiative in Switzerland.
 - II. Switzerland under the Referendum and Initiative.
 - III. Some American Institutions Compared with Swiss.
 - IV. Our King-President.
 - V. Why a Senate?
 - VI. Direct Legislation in the United States.
-

To be Issued about November 1.

PRICE, 25 CENTS.

THE "WHY I AMS."

CONTAINING

- Why I am a Protectionist. By Van Buren Denslow.
- " " Free Trader. By Prof. William G. Sumner.
- " " Single-Taxer. By William Lloyd Garrison.
- " " Socialist. By Laurence Gronlund.
- " " Christian Socialist. By Rev. W. D. P. Bliss, D D.
- " " Nationalist. By Burnette G. Haskell.
- " " Communist. By John Most.
- " " Social Revolutionist. By Dyer D. Lum.
- " " an Anarchist. By Benj. R. Tucker.
- " " an Individualist. By Frank Q. Stuart.
- " " an Opportunist. By J. W. Sullivan.
- " I, an Anarchist, work with Socialists. By William Holmes.
- " "Anarchist, will not work with Socialists. By Victor Yarros.

Price, Fifteen Cents.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PUB. CO., NEW YORK.

Mr. Pentecost says of it: "It is a very clever, interesting, and unique book. Every one, and especially every woman, should read it."

"THE STRIKE OF A SEX."

Woman on Strike against the Male Sex for Sexual
Sovereignty.

BY GEO. N. MILLER.

Astonishing praises follow "THE STRIKE OF A SEX" wherever it is read, both in this country and in England. Although it relates to the most delicate subject in the world, it is treated so reverently that the most refined women are enthusiastic for its circulation.

"I wish it were in my power to buy thousands of copies of this book, and put them into the hands of the women of this country."
—[A Lady Minister.

"I could not give my daughter the 'Kreutzer Sonata,' but she shall read 'The Strike of a Sex.'"—[From a lady in California.

"It is a timely contribution to the reform literature of the day, and of exceeding interest."—[From a writer in the Arena.

"Strong, clean, vigorous work. The world is ready for it."—
[From a well-known American authoress.

"'The Strike of a Sex,' by Geo. N. Miller, reappears in a fourth edition, a fact which shows that the book has received the appreciative and thoughtful recognition it deserves. From a pure-minded and lofty standpoint, the author discusses the marriage relation as it exists at present, and pleads that woman be raised to a position where she shall be equal with man, in which she shall have complete control of her own person, and shall be saved from the fate of becoming a mere propagative drudge. It is not against maternity that he cries out, but against the curse of enforced maternity. There is nothing ranting in the book, nor anything that can in any way shock the most fastidious or conservative reader. The treatment is calm, unimpassioned, thoroughly earnest, even reverent in tone."—[Public Opinion, July 4.

Besides, the idea of the book is so unique that it affords a basis for a story that few people can drop before finishing.

Price, 25 Cents.

Twentieth Century Publishing Co., New York.

"Inquirendo Island."

By HUDOR GENONE.

☞ Read what the sapient critics say, and then take your choice:

"A broad burlesque of Christian symbolism. The book fails from the beginning."—Independent.

"A singular and unique volume, setting forth the folly of Materialism, and seeking to divest religion of superstitious views and ceremonies."—Zion's Herald.

"A watery book—weak and insipid."—The Church, Philadelphia.

"An ingenious phantasy, in which while exposing the weakness associated with many forms of religion, the author reverently exalts what he regards as essential truth."—Episcopal Recorder.

"Grossly and offensively shocking to taste and propriety—stupid and vulgar blasphemy."—Churchman, New York.

"A book with a useful purpose."—Congregationalist.

"The author—an adventurous Atheist—sees only mockery and sham in the Christian Church and the worship of God."—Brooklyn Eagle.

"The purpose of the book is to elevate the simple truths of Christianity."—Advance, Chicago.

"Linked foolishness long drawn out."—New Orleans Times-Democrat.

"Not wanting in a spirit of full reverence for the essential truths of God's universe."—Christian Register.

"An attack on revealed religion."—N. Y. Times.

"A sincerely devotional frame of mind is manifested in these pages."—New York Telegram.

"We sympathize with the fear expressed in the 'postface' that the effect upon the world may be pernicious."—Interior, Chicago.

"Refreshing as a sight of Beulah land itself."—Hartford Post.

353 pages. Paper, 50 cents ; cloth, \$1.

Twentieth Century Pub. Co., 4 Warren St.,

NEW YORK.

'JUSTICE FOR THE CREATORS OF WEALTH

THE DAWNING.

A NOVEL.

By J. M. L. BABCOCK.

"THE DAWNING" is a novel that takes up the injustice done by the rich to the poor, the mischievous misunderstanding between employers and employed, the relation of capital to labor, the shortcomings of the Church, and the imperfections of the law in regard to workingmen. There is no angry vituperation, no abuse of the rich because they are rich; but the author has an intense feeling about the great injustice that lies at the foundation of the whole practical treatment of labor, about the bad effect of this injustice upon all classes, and the social dangers that it creates and fosters. The hero and heroine of the story are very noble characters. Langdon Bowditch becomes interested in workingmen, and frankly expresses his new ideas at his club and at the houses of his friends. He loses his popularity among the lighter and gayer youths of both sexes, but he wins the enduring love of a beautiful girl, who believes, as he believes, in faithfulness to one's ideal, and that for the only perfect love the ideal of both man and woman must be identical, must be a life 'resting on the basis of absolute right, intensified by the highest moral inspiration, devoted to the highest human good.'" . . . —[Boston Advertiser.

"The book is, on the whole, so good, and breathes such pure sentiments, that we are convinced that no one can read it without being elevated thereby, and we especially recommend it to those young men and women who are just entering upon life, and have not yet decided what part to take in it. It may help them to see, in the words of the author, 'that it is not what a man gains, but what he strives for, that indicates the tone and fibre of his character,' and that true happiness lies not in the beaten paths of the world, but in the comparatively untried paths of justice and truth."—[Liberty.

"It is an admirably digested and thoughtful work. The plot is ingenious, the action spirited, and the narrative eloquent."—[Philadelphia Item.

HIGHLY COMMENDED BY HUGH O. PENTECOST.

382 Pages. Paper, 50 Cents.

Twentieth Century Publishing Co., New York.

A Strike of Millionaires AGAINST MINERS;

— OR —

THE :: STORY :: OF :: SPRING :: VALLEY.

By HENRY D. LLOYD.

This book tells how the Spring Valley miners were starved into actual slavery. It is the story of a monstrous and inhuman crime. It deals not with theories but with facts, figures and names.

IT IS A POWERFUL AND PATHETIC BOOK.


264 Pages. Paper, 50 cents; cloth, \$1. Sent post-paid to any address on receipt of price, by

Twentieth Century Publishing Co., New York.

"A Tramp in Society."

BY

ROBT. H. COWDREY.



290 pp. 50c.; cloth, \$1.25.

A new "Reform" novel, by a well-known editorial writer and former candidate of the United Labor Party for the Presidency of the United States.

"There is not an uninteresting page in the book," is the verdict of Hugh O. Pentecost.

"Since the days that Mrs. Stowe wrote the doom of the slave-driver in 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' no author has struck a more vigorous blow in favor of the rights of the laborer."—Chicago Inter-Ocean.

"DRIVEN FROM SEA TO SEA."

By C. C. POST.

"Mr. Post's story is as pathetic as its title indicates, and must touch a responsive chord in every justice-loving heart. The mass of our people seem either ignorant of or indifferent to the cruel conflict now raging between honest sons of toil and ruthless corporations. Lands are redeemed from the desert, tilled and planted, only to become the prey to felonious railroad magnates, who buy, to serve their villanies, senators and congressmen, as openly as if these, our rulers, were slaves exposed for sale in market-places. Let no one be deterred from reading this valuable book."—Chicago Tribune.

414 pages. Many illustrations. 50 cents; cloth, \$1.25.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING COMPANY.

"Why Do Men Starve?"

— AND —

SEVENTEEN OTHER DISCOURSES,

— BY —

Charles Bradlaugh, Hugh O. Pentecost,

AND OTHERS.

By Bradlaugh.

1. Why Do Men Starve?
2. Labor's Prayer.
3. Poverty : and Its Effects on the Political Condition of the People.
4. The Land, the People, and the Coming Struggle.
5. Capital and Labor.
6. Socialism : Its Fallacies and Dangers.
- 7 Will Socialism Benefit the English People?
8. Some Objections to Socialism.

By Pentecost.

- 9 A Case of Starvation.
10. Wanted : Men Willing to Work for a Living.
11. The Toiling Children.
12. Charity.
- 13 Parents and Children.
14. Bismarckism
15. Jack the Ripper.
- 16 Whose Fault Is It?
- 17 The Evolution of Freedom. By HENRY FRANK.
18. A Modern Cöoperative Colony. By HAGAN DWEN.

Price, cloth, \$1.50.

Any of the above articles may be secured separately and in quantities.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING CO.

Twentieth Century

A WEEKLY RADICAL MAGAZINE.

HUGH O. PENTECOST, *Editor.*

Each number contains the address of the editor, delivered the preceding Sunday in New York, Brooklyn and Newark.

Motto : "HEAR THE OTHER SIDE."

This magazine advocates Personal Sovereignty in place of State Sovereignty, Voluntary Coöperation instead of Compulsory Coöperation, the Liberation of the human mind from Superstition, and the application of the principles of Ethics toward Social Regeneration.

It is meant to be a broad-minded, unsectarian meeting place for the representatives of all phases of Economic, Ethical, Political, Philosophical, Sociological, and Religious Thought. Orthodox and Liberal Christians, Spiritualists, Hebrews, Agnostics, Atheists, and Freethinkers of every shade of opinion; Protectionists, Free Traders, Single-taxers, Nationalists, Socialists, and Anarchists, advocates of peaceful measures of social regeneration and revolutionists, will all be welcomed to its columns with equal cordiality, fairness, and respect.

Some Contributors :

Edward Bellamy,
Edgar Fawcett,
Wm. Lloyd Garrison,
Laurence Gronlund,
Rev. J. C. Kimball,
Marie Louise,
Herr Most,
William M. Salter,
Benj. R. Tucker,
T. B. Wakeman,
James H. West,

Rev. John W. Chadwick,
Clinton Furbish,
Rabbi G. Gottheil,
J. K. Ingalls,
Dr. Daniel De Leon,
George Edgar Montgomery,
Hon. Frank T. Reid,
Rev. Minot J. Savage,
Gen. M. M. Trumbull,
Rev. J. M. Whiton, Ph.D.,
Victor Yarros,
Rev. R. Heber Newton.

Rev. W. S. Cröwe,
Rev. Henry Frank,
Helen H. Gardener,
Robert G. Ingersoll,
Dyer D. Lum,
Edmund Montgomery,
Prof. Wm. G. Sumner,
W. L. Sheldon,
Si Skokum,
Otto Wettstein,
A. Van Deusen,

Subscription—One year, \$2; six months, \$1; three months, 60 cents; single copies, 5 cents. Five new subscriptions or one renewal and four new subscriptions, \$7.50. To foreign countries in the postal union, one year, \$3.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PUBLISHING CO.